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DEFORMATION OF THE FNR SHIM-SAFETY RODS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ford Nuclear Reactor (FNR), located in the Phoenix
Memorial Laboratory on the North Campus of The University of
Michigan, is a one megawatt pool type reactor fueled with MTR type
fuel elements. Control of the reactor is accomplished by the use
of three shim—safety rods and one control rod. These rods move
vertically inside special fuel elements in which guide tubes have
been inserted in place of the center fuel plates. The shim-safety
rods for the FNR, as their name implies, serve the dual function of
shim controland safety protection. These rods, worth approximately
3 per cent negative reactivity each, drop into the reactor under the
influence of gravity when potentially dangerous conditions exist in
the reactor. This results from an interruption of the currents to
electromagnets which normally couple the rods to their respective
drive mechanisms. A shim—safety rod is constructed from an extruded
aluminum tube welded to appropriate endpieces and filled with boron
carbide powder (see Sketch I page 2). The powder is loaded through
an aperture at the bottom end of the rod. This hole is plugged and
welded after the rod is filled.
The FNR was put into operation in September of. 1957 and,
afterinitial calibrations, was raised to a power level of 100
kilowatts in February of 1958. Full power operation at one megawatt
began in September 1958.
InrAugust of 1960 a potentially hazardous condition arose
when one of the shim—safety rods jammed in its special fuel element



































































































































consequences. in that the condition was immediately detected and no
further attempt was made to start the reactor. All three shim—
safety rods were removed and examined. The jammed rod appeared. to
be deformed. To keep the reactor in..operation, three new shim—
safety. rods were procured, installed.and calibrated. The new rods
were identical to the. original set except for.. the addition of
cadmium liners. The original shim—safety rods are designated as
1-A, 1—B and 1—C, and thenew rods as2-A, 2-B and2-C. The original
.set.of rods had .been in the reactor for 2200 megawatt hours before
the jamming incident occurred.
In view of the potentially serious consequences of jammed
shim—safety rods, the new rods.were removed from the reactor after
320 megawatt hours for an accurate dimensional check. All three
rods showed evidence of swelling, and rod 2—C was off—gassing through
the bottom plug weld. One of the original rods (1-C) which was in
good condition, was substituted for rod 2-C. The shim-safety rods
presently installed in the FNR are 2-A, 2-B and 1-C, all of which
undergo daily rod—drop tests and are removed from the reactor on a
regular schedule and measured dimensionally.
The following sections of this report describe the jamming
incident and rod deformations in greater detail, discuss our. initial
exploratory investigations, and suggest a program of investigation
which might establish conclusively the cause of. these difficulties.
A final report wilibe distributed after the comp.letion.of the
program of investigation suggested herein.
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II, DESCRIPTION OF SHIM-SAFETY ROD INCIDENTS
A. Incident Invo1ving Rods 1-A, 1-B and 1-C
During reactor start-up on August11, 1960, .themagnet
contact light ;.for shim—safety rod 1—A. indicatedioss:of contact
when the rods had been raised about ten inches from their:lower
‘limits. This indicated that rod 1-A had become disengaged from the
electromagnet which had been pulling the rod out of the reactor core.
Withdrawal of the rods was immediately stopped. The staff. observer
at poolside reported that rod..1—A was still in the raised position
even though magnet current was automatically cut off when the magnet—
contact light on the operating console indicated the loss of the rod.
The special fuel element for rod,.l-A was .not.dislodged from its
position in the reactor core.
At this ,point the currents to the other two electro
magnets were manually cut off. The pool side observer reported
that rods .l-B and 1—C dropped normally into the core1 but .rod..1-A
remained suspended. The electromagnets were lowered and 1—A magnet—
contact light indicated contact as soon as the electromagnet struck
.the suspended rod. The rod was then .successfully.driven to its
lower, limit of travel by its electromagnet..and drive mechanism
The .reactor.was further ‘secured and fuel was removed
from the lattice along with the special control element containing
safety rod 1—A. The rod—element assembly was moved to a.holder in
the center. of the reactor pool. A grappling tool. pulled the rod
about ten inches out of the control element before the rod. jammed
again. Inspection showed noticeable swelling, of the rod.
A special tool was built to remove the rod from the
element. Plate No. 1, page 5, is a photograph of. this removal device.
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PLATE I - REMOVAL DEVICE
This device attached to the special fuel element was used to






During the extraction procedure the fuel element was kept submerged
in,four feet of water for radiation shielding purposes. There was
no serious galling of the rod during the removal procedure, nor
:was there any off—gassing from the rod. There was no evidence of
corrosion; or damage to the external surface of the rod. Also,
•there was. no apparent damage to the special fuel element.
The three shim—safety rods had been.inthe reactor
since the.beginning of.operation in September ‘1957. The reactor had
operated.at power.;levels up to one megawatt for a total of .2200
megawatt—hours. There were no indications prior to the incident
that safety rod 1-A ,was sticking within the guide tube of the special
fuel element. The rods on the FNR.were inspected on several. oc
casions since 1957 by removing them from the reactor and visually
inspecting them under about six feet of water. Also, during, that
time, frequent rod—magnet release time measurements were ‘made.
Further, prior to every start—up rod drop tests ‘are performed.
None of these indicatedpotential jamming
B. Incident Involving Rods 2-A, 2-B and 2-C
After the above incident anew special fuel element
.was;installed in the lattice and three new replacement shim—safety
rods .2A, .2—B and .2-C were installed and calibrated. On November 25,
1960, these rods were removed from the reactor for ‘observation .and
dimensional checks. Micrometer measurements showed .that all three
.rods had increased in thickness after only 320 hours at one megawatt.
Furthermore, rod .2—C was off-gassing at the bottom..plug weld.. A
water—filled Erlenmeyer flask was held .over. the submerged rod to
collect a sample of the gas for analysis.
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The cadmium liners in the new set of rods hindered
operations because -of the induced radioactivity which gave a 6
roentgens per hour reading at the center -of -the rods. The bottom
ends of the rods read greater than 25 roentgens per hour. In
contrast, rods 1—A, 1-B and 1—C, without cadmium liners, read
one-third of a roentgen per hour at the lower end.
III. INVESTIGATIONS
A. Dimensional Inspection
After removal from the reactor a complete dimensional
inspection was made of rods lU-A, 1-B and 1-C. The thickness and
width dimensions are shown in Tables I and II respectively (see
pages 8 and 9). The dimensions of the replacement rods 2-A, 2-B
and 2—C before installation in the reactor are also shown in these
tables. Although no records of the initial dimensions are available
for rods 1-A, 1-B and 1-C, a reasonable indication of the degree of
swelling which took place can be obtained by an intercomparison of
rod dimensions. However, initial and final thickness measurements
taken at the middle of the rod are available for rods 2-A, 2-B and
• 2-C which had been in the reactor for 320 megawatt hours. These
measurements are as follows:
Measurement Shim—Safety Rod
2-A 2-B 2-C
Initial 0.922 in. 0,890 in. 0.913 in.
Final 0.928 0.921 0.925
Change 0.006 0.031 0.012
The inside dimensions of the guide tube of the
special fuel elements are presented in the last column of Table I.
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Thickness
TABLE I - SHIM-SAFETY ROD THICKNESS DIMEN:SIONS
Note: The corresponding internal
dimensions of the guide tube
inside special fuel element 1-A
are given in the last column.
GUIDE
1-A 1-B 1-C 2-A 2-B 2-C TUBE.
0.882 0.880 0.865 0.875 0.877 0.875 1,100
0.925 0.920 0.904 0.901 0,883 0.889 1,100
1,078 0,915 0,905 0.910 0.883 0.909 1.100
1.107 0,916 0.905 0,915 0,889 0.914 1.100
1.103 0.912 0.906 0.920 0.892 0.915 1.100
1.097 04915 0,908 0.922 0.891 0.914 1.100
1.093 0.913 0,909 0.922 0.890 0.913 1.100
1.091 0.913 0,909 0.922 0.890 0.913 1,100
1.087 0,914 0,909 0,922 0.892 0.913 1.i05
1,088 0,919 0,909 0,923 0,892 0.914 1,105
1.106 0,920 0,908 0,921 0,892 0,915 1,105
1.090 0,915 0,909 0,922 0.884 0,915 1.105
1,057 0,917
:
0,909 0.917 0.882 0.910 1.105
1,009 0,886 0,867 0,897 0,872 0,888 1,105
0,875 0,888 0,890 0.886 0.870 1,105
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TABLE II - SHIM-SAFETY ROD WIDTH DIMENSIONS
Width
_______
1—B 1—C 2—A 2—B 2—C
— 2.242 2.242 2.245 2.251 2.245 2.248
— 2.239 2.249 2,246 2.258 2.245 2.239
— 2.175 2.244 2,249 2.255 2.232 2,227
— 2.187 2.250 2.247 2.255 2.225 2.225
— 2.187 2.247 2.250 2.252 2.225 2.225
2.184 2,250 2,250 2.251 2.225 2,225
— 2.187 2,249 2.250 2.250 2.225 2,226
— 2.191 2.248 2.251 2.250 2.225 2.226
— 2,184 2.248 2,253 2.248 2.225 2.226
— 2.183 2.247 2.253 2.251 2.225 2.227
— 2.185 2,247 2,255 2.252 2,225 2,226
— 2.200 2.245 2,255 2.252 2.225 2,226
— 2.227 2.251 2.247 2.255 2.230 2.231





B. Radiographic and Dye Penetrant Studies
Complete radiographs were taken to determine the
conditions inside the rods. The most significant finding from these
radiographs was the presence of a void above the B4C powder in the
rods. This is shown in Plate II on page 11. Dye.penetrant.tests
indicated pitting on the surface of the rods but no cracks were
revealed.
C. techniques for Collection. of Gas and B4C Powder Samples
The apparatus shown in Sketch II, page 12., was set up
to measure any existing pressure and to collect any gas contained
in the rod. The apparatus consisted of a self-sealing puncturing
device with a pressure—vacuum gauge and an evacuated reservoir for
collecting gas samples from the rod. Two rods, 1—A and 1—B, were
punctured at the top where the voids were located. After the gas
samples were removed, both rods were subjected to internal pressures
of 40 psig while immersed in. water.
The rods were then opened by cuttingout a section
.on one side of each rod, The section that.was removed is shown .in
Sketch III on page 13. Care.was taken to avoid getting aluminum
shavings in the B4C powder. Samples of the powder were removed
from different positions along the length of the rod.
D. Analysis of Contents of ShimRods
Gas Analysis
When pressure measurements were made on the two shim—
safety rods, 1—B had a pressure of 20 psig while rod l-A, the
deformed rod, was at atmospheric pressure. The gas samples from
1—A, 1—Band 2—C were analyzed using a mass spectrometer.
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PLATE II - RADIOGRAPH OF THE TOP END OF A SHIM-SAFETY ROD
The light vertical rods are lead filled ballast tubes. The darkest
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The results are as follows:
Gas Analyses
(in Mole per Cent)
Rod 1-A Rod which jammed
Rod 1—B “Normal rod”
Rod 2-C Rod which off-gassed
•Gas 1-A 1-B :2-C
112 36.42 78.6 39.47
02 36.00 0.4 14.98
N2 23.23 15.4 44.54
CO2 1.70 4.6 0.15
A 0.29 0.35 0.71
He 0.0 0.7 0.0
Note that the hydrogen—oxygen concentrations observed in
1—A and 2-C are in the detonable range.
Analysis of B4CPowder and Inspection of Rod Interiors
When rod 1—B was opened, the B4C powder was dry and
lightly packed. The interior walls of the rod were not corroded.
The powder removed from the lower portion of the rod was radio
active and had a total beta—gamma activity of about 3 mr/hr/gram on
contact. A gamma spectral analysis indicated the presence of Mn54,
65 60Zn , and Co . Analyses of the B4C by emission spectroscopy showed
the most predominant impurities to be Al, Cu, Fe,-Zn and Mn. The
supplier of the B4C powder reports 98.79% B, 1.08% C, 0.10% Si,
0.02%Se and 0.02% N.
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The B4C in rod 1-A0 the deformed rod, was found to
be in a caked rather than a powdered form as in rod 1—B. The hard
.layerwas concentrated between .the ballast rods along.the lower six
inches of the shim rod. This cake had a grayish appearance unlike
the characteristically black color of B4C powder. The powder
removed from the lower portion of rod 1-A was found to contain
approximately 5 weight per cent water.
Oxidation was prevalent on the interior.walls at the
lower end of rod 1—A. A crust of A1203 surrounded the lead filled
aluminum ballast rods.
The water found in rod 1-A indicated a leak had oc
curred. However, the 40 psig pressure test before sectioning
failed to show such. a leak, Therefore9 another attemptwas made
to locate a leak in rod 1-A with the powder removed and the inner
surface cleaned. This was done by replacing and rewelding the
removed section and pressurizing to 40 psig. Under these conditions
a 30 cc/hr leak was noted at the top of the rod where the endpiece
is welded to the extruded tube. The gas leaked from avery small
hole which looked much like the pits revealed by the dye penetrant
test.
The leakage rate was reduced drastically by evacuating
and then re-pressurizing the rod. It appeared that the leak was
capable of a valve—like action which was dependent on the internal
pressures Of the rod.
IV. POSSIBLE EXPLaNATION. OF DEFORMATION
Consideration has been given to the possible causes of the
swelling of rod 1-A. The deformation of rods 2-A, 2-B and 2-C,
although not as great as that of 1—A0 was also considered.
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The hypotheses are:
A. Mechanical stresses resulting from expansion of wet
B4C powder.
B. Internal gas pressure generated by:
1. B’° (nt, a) Li7 reactions
2. Chemical reactions between B4C and 1120
3.. chemical reactions between Li7 and 1120
4. Radiolysis of 1120
Several experiments and calculations have been made to
assist in evaluating these hypotheses.
A.. The hypothesis that the deformation of the rod was
a resultof volumetric changes in wetted B4C powder appears to be
without foundation. Radial measurements of a polyethylene bottle
containing wetted B4C at room temperature showed no dimensional
changes during an eight week period of observation.
B-l. It has been demonstrated that apressure of approxi
mately 110 psig is required to obtain the degree of deformation
observed for rod 1—A.. Calculations indicate that the generation
of this pressure by helium as a result of (n0 a) reactions on
boron is extremely doubtful. Further, the gas analysis of rods
1-A and 1-B showed a relatively low concentration of helium.
B-2. The hypothesis involving a chemical reaction between
B4C and.H20 has been given little consideration since the reaction
rate constant is small even at temperatures of 400°C. (Reference 1)
B-3. Significant pressures from the Li-H20 reaction are
unlikely in view of the low lithium concentrations from the
B10(n,c) Li7 reactions.
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B—4. Present data strongly indicates that the necessary
pressure to cause the observed rod deformation can be generated
inside the rod by the radiolytic decomposition of water into gaseous
hydrogen and oxygen To produce free H2 and 02r this reaction
requires free radical scavengers which could well be the B4C powder
itself1 impurities in the powder, impurities in the water or the
component parts of the rod (References 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).. The
generation of gases was notthe only prerequisite for the rod
deformation. In addition, either the hole which allowed water
to get into the rod and which allowed gas to escape must have
closed off at some time or, the gas generation rate far exceeded
the gas leakage rate.
The possibility of having water present at the time
the rods were sealed in the fabrication process was considered
since a small amount of water is capable of causing rod deformation.
This is especially significant since B4C powder is naturally
• hygroscopic.
In the case of the deformed rod, the above possi
bility was discounted in favor of an external leak since the rod
was in the reactor for a long period of time before jamming
occurred. However, this possibility exists for rods 2-A, 2-B and
2-Ce It is therefore imperative that the B4C powder used in
fabricating shim-safety rods be dried and subsequently handled
in humidity controlled environments.
In an attempt to demonstrate the feasibility of
generating significant quantities of gas in reasonably short
periods of time, an experiment was designed which would simulate
the conditions that were suspected within the jammed rod. Two
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small, aluminum sealed vessels, one containing water and the other
water and B4C powder were installed adjacent to the reactor core
12
in a thermal flux of 5 x 10 neutrons persquare centimeter—
second and a gamma field of 5 x 1O7 roentgens per hour. Pressures
in these chambers were monitored over a period of three days
during which time the reactor operated at a power level of one
megawatt for 50 hours. The pressure in the chaniber containing
water and E4C powder increased linearly with respect to reactor
;operating time at a rate of l.2psig per hour See Graph I, page 19.
This test chamber had a volume of 295 cc and contained 10 grains of
water and 25 grams of B4C powder. The pressure in the chamber
containing water only was 1.1 psig after 50 hours of reactor oper
ation as compared to 60 psig in .the chamber containing both water
and B4C powder.
Analysis showed that the gas generated in the water—
B4C chamber contained predominantly a hydrogen—oxygen gas mixture
in a 2:1 ratio, similar to the finding for rod 2-C.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Deformation of shim—safety rods because of internal
pressure could lead to the following dangerous conditions:
1. Withdrawal of a special fuel element during start-up.
Any subsequent release and drop of this special fuel element
could result in a large and rapid increase in the positive reac
tivity of the reactor.
2. Jamming of the rods during reactor operation. In
















rods into the reactor when unsafe conditions existor even for
routi-ie shut down. This is a.particularly serious possibility
in reactors which operate at power for long periods of time.
3. Detonation of the hydrogen-oxygen gas mixture
contained in the shim-safety rods. This could cause damage to
the reactor core in. addition to rupturing the rod. Although such
a detonation appears to be improbable, it is nevertheless a
potential hazard that needs further investigation, especially in
strong radiation fields.
Operational Recommendations
In view of the important function of shim—safety rods, a
detailed inspection should be made of all rods before installation
in a. reactor. Records of these inspections, especially weights in
water and dimensional measurements, should be maintained for
reference purposes. A careful survey of the surface conditions
of the rods including all welds is extremely important. Radio—
graphs have proved valuable in determining internal conditions of
reactor rods.
In addition to the initial tests, shim-safety rods should
undergo periodic inspections. The FNR is presently on a schedule
calling for rod inspection every 320 megawatt hours of operation.
This inspection requires the rods to be removed from the reactor,
the dimensions measured directly and the surface observed for
corrosion or any other indication of damage, such as off—gassing.
Close attention should also be given to the potential
hazards that exist ‘when water containing free—radical scavengers
is present in any sealed experiment or device located in a
radiation field.
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Recommendations for Design. and Fabrication
Consideration should be given to the design of new shim-
safety rods which would avoid the possibility of the generation
of gases leading to high pressures. Further,. consideration should
be given to the design of the special fuel elements for these rods
which would.minimize the possibility of jamming. Any arrangement
of element and rod which would make dimensional changes easily
and readily detectable would be a decided improvement over our
present system.
In the:.fabrication of shim—safety rods similar to those
presently.used on.the FNR it is extremely important that all
substances capable of producing gases in the presence of radiation
be held to a minimum. These substances include volatile degreasing
agents, water, used for rinsing and any water contained in the
‘B4C powder.
Proposed Investigations
As a result of this investigation of the shim-safety rod
incident, it has become evident that the following subjects should
be investigated more thoroughly.
1. The internal, pressures necessary for. shim—safety
rod deformation.
2. Gas and pressure generation in shim—safety rods
located in a reactor. core as a function. of water content in B4C
‘powder.
3. The effect of alpha particles and lithium recoils
from B4C powder on the radiolytic process.
4. The sources of free—radical scavengers which are
required in the radiolytic process.
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5. Possible sources of ignition energy for the detonation
of hydrogen—oxygen gas mixtures.
Recognizing the importance of the above problems, these
investigations will be undertaken at the Phoenix Memorial Laboratory.
Financial assistance will be required for a thorough investigation
of. these problems.
From, an operational point of view, the :removal ‘of shim—
safety rods from their special fuel elements and the reactor for
dimensional tests is a time consuming and complicated manipulation.
Inanatternpt to simplify these inspections a study of”in situ”
rod inspection techniques will be undertaken. Further, the criteria
for the frequency and technique of inspection for shim-safety rods
will be re-evaluated in light of the results of the aforementioned
experimental investigations.
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